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Introduction 
“The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him so 
much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors.” 
(Adam Smith, cited in Campbell, Skinner & Todd, 1981, p.388) 
For most citizens, the lofty works of long-dead economists make unlikely reading, but 
supporters of the deregulation policy regime have long been fond of quoting Adam 
Smith as legitimation for prescriptive policies. Familiar to most would be the theory 
of the invisible hand of the market; and the regime’s unending opposition to collective 
bargaining by labour has its basis in an interpretation of Smith’s thesis on monopolies. 
Monopolies distort the market price mechanism, though both Smith and Karl Marx 
showed that such distortions were not confined to the labour market. Declining use of 
the classics in school literature almost certainly contributes to a narrowing 
appreciation for such works. Among the classics, Cervantes tale of Don Quixote 
shows the futility of struggle, even with strong incentive, when the adversary is 
misidentified. For Quixote, the incentive was personal glory, a discursive theme for 
simpler times; but how many citizens today, economically marginalised or even 
socially excluded by various categories of unemployment and the discourse of Mutual 
Obligation, could clearly state their aim, their incentive, and where to meaningfully 
direct their struggle? 
 In the Cold War discourse, incentive provided a convenient difference between the 
socialist and capitalist economic systems – under the benevolent state, we were told, 
there was no incentive to work. Since the end of the Cold War, the issue of incentive 
has gained prominence in the politics of unemployment, particularly in the discourse 
on Mutual Obligation. In tracing the rising prominence of incentive, this paper will 
give consideration to contesting values or ideologies and the political support they 
have received; the rise of the deregulation policy regime; and institutional change that 
has occurred or is pending. The purpose is to identify the struggle and its adversaries, 
and to highlight the inequality in that struggle. For the history of deregulation, the 
paper relies on the work of Briggs and Buchanan (2000), and the analyses rely upon 
Bernholz’ (1995) work on the causes of change in political-economic regimes, 
George’s (1997) Winning the War of Ideas, and Brennan and Pincus’ (2002) study of 
change to Australia’s economic institution. 
Deregulation: institutionalising incentive 
The history of deregulation in Australia is the story of dismantling majority 
participation in governing the workplace, and of removing the positive incentives to 
work that sustained three decades of full employment defined as a job for everyone 
wishing to participate in paid work (Crombie, 2002). A policy regime is defined as the 
combination of public policies and institutional arrangements that govern a major 
issue. As the principal concern of this brief study is incentive as it pertains to the area 
of unemployment policy, the deregulation policy regime is considered here as the 
policies and institutional arrangements dedicated to deregulation of the labour market 
as governance of unemployment. Incentive, similar to Brennan & Castles (2002), is 
considered as “rewards and punishments, often understood in a rather narrow 
‘economic’ sense” (p.4), or, in the blunt words of the member for Warringah, “carrots 
and sticks” (Abbott, 2003-09-25, Para. 11). 
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 Briggs and Buchanan (2000) provide a useful chronology and assessment of the 
stages of labour market deregulation that occurred between 1975 and 2000. Their 
story begins with the early successes of the tripartite arrangement of the Prices and 
Incomes Accord following the 1983 election of the Hawke Government. This 
generated rebellion on the part of some employers over what they saw as the 
undeserved political power of unions, bias on the part of the Industrial Relations 
Commission, and the maintenance of high wages. These managerial militants saw the 
Commission and Government as having been captured by so-called special interest 
groups and advocated replacement of the arbitration system with individual workplace 
agreements enforced by common law and civil courts. Prominent among the coalition 
of groups comprising this movement was the H.R. Nicholls Society, whose founding 
members include the Howard Government Treasurer, Peter Costello, and Charles 
Copeman of Peko Wallsend, who later distinguished himself in the lockout of 1000 
workers at Robe River. The movement was able to generate sufficient political 
pressure for change to begin in 1987 with the introduction of a two-tier wage increase 
incorporating an enterprise component. The Commission extended these options in 
1988, and by 1989 flexibility as a principle had taken firm hold (ibid., 2000). The 
Business Council of Australia (BCA), an exclusive employer organisation (Marsh, 
1995), carried out its own study of the labour market and advocated structural reform 
by which no single workplace would be represented by more than one union. This 
would ensure enterprise bargaining relative to that workplace. At the insistence of the 
BCA, a two-stream system providing employees with an option to bargain 
individually was included in the Industrial Relations Act of 1988 (Briggs & 
Buchanan, 2000). 
BCA’s intellectual leadership provided momentum for the “new right” (Briggs & 
Buchanan, 2000), as this movement was dubbed by Labor Minister Mick Young 
(Hyde, 2002). Paul Kelly is cited by Briggs and Buchanan (2000) as saying that by 
1990, the radical extremists of the free market had become the mainstream of the 
Liberal Party.  In its 1990 electoral platform, the Coalition, in opposition, included a 
third optional stream that was totally outside the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
Briggs and Buchanan state that this had a major impact in garnering support from 
bureaucrats and media commentators. Bipartisan support maintained the momentum. 
Brennan and Pincus (2002) note that similar shifts in policy regimes occurred 
throughout the West. In 1991, New Zealand abolished their arbitration framework, 
leaving workers without the protection of awards, tribunals or the legal status of 
unions (Briggs & Buchanan, 2000). At state level, the new Kennett Government of 
Victoria abolished compulsory arbitration in 1992. Further reforms during 1992-1993 
shifted the role of the Commission from one of acting in the public interest to that of a 
facilitator of workplace agreements (ibid. 2000).  
The Coalition is the only group of people in this nation who offer a real alternative 
of incentive and opportunity to get this nation moving again. 
(O’Chee, 1992) 
In 1992, Australia was experiencing unemployment of 11.3% and the Coalition in 
opposition was arguing for the introduction of Jobsback, the unemployment policy 
component for the more comprehensive economic package known as Fightback (ibid. 
1992). While policies of the Labor Government attempted to provide incentive for 
employers to hire the long-term unemployed, its white paper, Working Nation, 
introduced elements of what was to become Mutual Obligation (Finn, 1997). The new 
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Coalition Government’s Workplace Relations Act of 1996 further curtailed the 
powers of the Commission and created more incentives for non-award agreements, as 
union access to the workplace became more complex. The Coalition had long argued 
that deregulation, following Adam Smith, would allow the price of labour to fall and 
clear the surplus of labour. With institutional change to the arbitration system all but 
complete, it was time to shake loose the unworthy recipients of welfare. 
Mutual obligation is the policy of ensuring that only the worthy receive a welfare 
benefit; and they will be deemed worthy because they give something back for what 
they receive. In 1997, work-for-the-dole (WFD) was being engineered to provide 
incentive for the young. As a prelude to this, the Government had expanded on the 
incentives previously supplied to small business, by abolishing the unfair dismissal 
laws. These, it said, were a disincentive to employment.  
The government recognises that … low skilled jobs that young people used to take 
on leaving school have gradually disappeared and those jobs that remain are 
increasingly being taken by … more experienced job seekers (Kemp, 1997). 
The Government proposed to provide that missing experience in the form of WFD. 
For Australia to advance as a productive and internationally competitive nation, we 
must instil in our children a sense of mutual obligation (Entsch, 1997). 
In his address at the Australia Unlimited conference, Prime Minister Howard (1999) 
outlined his government’s approach to the issues facing Australia. This, he said was 
founded on liberalisation in economic policy and modern conservatism in social 
policy. It is an approach to social policy that aims at supporting the institution of 
family as the source of stable values such as self-reliance and obligation to other 
members of the community. The main defining factor, however, is the principle of 
Mutual Obligation. Contrasting this with an older conservatism of supporting the 
disadvantaged until they found work “of their choosing”, modern conservatism, he 
said, would provide incentives to encourage such an outcome. But WFD, or Active 
Labour Market Programs (ALMP), are not new. They may be modern, for certainly 
they were around at the start of modernity. There is evidence in Ireland, for example, 
of roads that go nowhere and bridges that are not located on roads, constructed by the 
poor recipients of welfare at that time (McMahon, 1996).  As early as 1601, the 
Elizabethan Poor Law entrenched the culture of work-for-the-dole and, in fact, 
categorised the able bodied as people who could work but wouldn’t – and required 
that they be beaten severely until they saw the error of their ways (The Peel Web). In 
the 20th century, the modern welfare state had progressed beyond such a history.  
Does WFD provide the necessary experience as an incentive for employers? After six 
years of expansion of WFD, Saunders & Tsumori (2003) are succinct on this 
question. It is not intended to function as a stepping stone to employment, but rather 
as an incentive for the unemployed to find paid work. Fortunately for many, this 
regressive policy has not included the physical beating integral to its parent model. 
Mitchell (2003), writing for The Age Newspaper, argued There are simply not enough 
jobs. His was a creative analogy with farmers suffering because of drought. Since 
there are now technological advances to limit the impact of drought on farming in 
areas where conventional farming has suffered badly, should we now penalise farmers 
for their lack of motivation to provide for bad seasons? Mitchell suggests that this is 
an inappropriate analysis because the “root cause of the problem is clear – not enough 
rain is not enough rain”, but it is also inappropriate to “arraign our most 
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disadvantaged citizens with accusations that they are lazy and unskilled” when the 
problem is a lack of jobs.  
Mitchell is a Director at the Centre of Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE), a 
centre that provides a forum for both sides in the debate on unemployment. Amanda 
Vanstone, Minister for Family and Community Services, addressed a centre audience 
with a speech entitled “Passive Welfare – Killing Them Softly?” (Vanstone, 2003). 
Vanstone praised Indigenous leader Noel Pearson for his support of the Government 
attitude to welfare reform. This argument was used earlier by Tony Abbott, perhaps 
the most vociferous motivator of the unemployed, as he was Bridging the Incentive 
Gap at the Australia Unlimited Conference (Abbott, 1999). Aboriginal people had 
been leading the way on WFD for over twenty years. He was referring to the 
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP). While neglecting to 
mention the poor employment outcomes of that scheme for Indigenous people, he 
claimed that “[a] government with the best interests of all its citizens at heart will try 
to create a climate of incentives which re-inforces people’s instincts to be active and 
successful” (ibid., Para. 10). This heralded expansion of WFD, which Abbott 
legitimated with the case of New Zealand where recipients can be placed on work 
programmes from the first day.  
Gathering support 
In 2002, Abbott was motivating the H.R. Nicholls Society with Losing the Legislation 
Fixation (Abbott, 2002).  The Howard Government had introduced a raft of legislative 
reforms to make the Industrial Relations Commission more amenable to the national 
interest but business executives were not utilising this resource. He pledged the 
government’s support for the rule of law and urged executives to tackle their 
industrial relations challenges. Citing holiday loading as a disincentive to potential 
overseas investors, and a “quixotic attempt by the National Farmers Federation nearly 
two decades ago” (ibid., Para. 22), he urged them to be proactive.  
…managers…ought to know that the Government is on their side and will do 
everything in its power not to let them down (ibid., Para. 25). 
In a parody of Chifley, Abbott warned the Labor states that freedom under the law 
was the Howard Government’s “light on the hill” (ibid., 2002, Para. 20). If the 
government was shaping that law to suit a particular interest, one could ask whose 
freedom that would be. 
Abbott has maintained a high public profile. On 16 July 2003, he spoke at the 
Employee Share Ownership Launch (Abbott, 2003) of defusing class tension without 
revolution. Employees who also share in the profits of a company would not 
unreasonably pursue wage increases that might cost jobs. On 8 August 2003, he was 
addressing the Centre for Independent Studies Consilium on The West and its 
Challenges (Abbott, 2003) - essentially an appeal to conservative values. On 25 
September 2003, he addressed the Mission Employment Launch on Taking 
Obligations Seriously (Abbott, 2003). Under new changes to the Job Network, no-one 
would be forgotten, neglected, or ignored. Having outlined the various ways of 
making the unemployed active, he continued with the OECD’s estimate of the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), claiming it to be the 
unemployment rate when the economy is doing well. Given the Reserve Bank’s 
targeting of inflation, the NAIRU is the lowest rate of unemployment that policy 
changes would seek (Crombie, 2002). The difference between the actual rate of 
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unemployment (5.8%) and the NAIRU (5.5%) means that the target of placements for 
the new Job Network is around 30,000 of an unemployed body of around 600,000. He 
spoke, however, of 720,000 registered job seekers and a problem with vocational 
profile interviews of which 900,000 of 1.6 million were not attended (Abbott, 2003).   
Barns (2003) links the minister to the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) where 
Peter Saunders responds to much of the argument in opposition to the Howard 
Government’s policies. Saunders explains the seemingly contradictory numbers as 
follows in an editorial from the Sydney Morning Herald (2002). The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2001-2002 shows that 13% of the workforce was unemployed at 
some time during the year, but only 1.4% was unemployed for the whole year (ibid., 
2002).  With an aggregate of around 6%, this means that there is a churn rate of 
around 3 times per year for the 4.6% sporadically unemployed. Abbott claimed in his 
address to Mission Employment (op.cit.) that around 60% of the unemployed were 
disincentivated by misleading pseudo-statistics claiming about seven job seekers for 
every job advertised. Certainly, this is an argument supported by the research of 
CofFEE among others (see Mitchell, 2003). Saunders refutes this with a claim that 
most jobs are not advertised, questioning the figures without offering an alternative, 
and thereby leaving open the possible explanation, stemming from the problem of 
inexperience acknowledged above by David Kemp, that job advertisements are 
targeted at the employed with relative experience, rather than the unemployed who 
have none; another potential churn.  
Barns (2003) described Tony Abbott as a hit with the right-wing liberal think tanks 
such as CIS and the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA). Peter Costello is a founding 
member of the H.R. Nicholls Society. David Kemp’s father formed IPA in 1943, 
predating Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society by 4 years but later became an affiliate in the 
network of dry liberal think tanks that spread from that historic meeting (Cockett, 
1995; Marsh, 1995).  From Hayek’s invitational meeting in 1947, the Mont Pelerin 
Society has obtained a strong and developing hold on the UK through the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA) and spread throughout the USA under the guidance of one of 
its founding members, Milton Friedman (Cockett, 1995). John Hyde (2002) claims 
that the IEA provided the ideas that sustained the Thatcher revolution. Hyde is the 
Director of the IPA and his 2002 book, “Dry: In defence of dry liberal think tanks”, 
provides a comprehensive account of the right-wing think tanks in Australia along 
with their claims of influence. Along with Professor Michael Porter’s Tasman 
Institute and Gerard Henderson’s Sydney Institute, the CIS, the IPA and the H.R. 
Nicholls Society comprise the Australian arm regional network. Apart from the role 
of the H.R. Nicholls Society in initiating labour market deregulation, the IPA and the 
Tasman Society cooperated on Project Victoria, the re-creation of Victoria under the 
Kennett Government (Hyde, 2002; Parkinson, 2000). Industrial relations aspects of 
this project fed into the federal deregulation program of the 1990’s (Hyde, 2002).  
The Australian think tanks have gained increasing recognition in what Uhr (2000) has 
analysed as a shift towards a deliberative democracy, one that invests in structured 
public deliberation to aid decision making. Uhr differentiated between policy-active 
interest groups, such as non-government organisations (NGO’s), and policy research 
bodies. The former, as well as governments, may use the research data of the latter. 
There are also different categories of policy-research bodies, differing mainly in 
relation to funding sources. University-based research centres receive direct 
government support while others, such as the dry liberal think tanks, rely on corporate 
sponsorship, subsidised in turn through taxation concessions. While Marsh (op.cit., 
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1995) states that funding for Australian think tanks has not been as generous as that in 
the USA, they still attract resources that are simply not available to welfare advocacy 
groups. A recent development in the field has been the foundation of the Lowy 
Institute for International Policy with an initial cash injection of $30 million from 
Westfield founder, Frank Lowy (McKew, 2003). The think tanks claim independence 
because of the lack of direct government support. Sustainable credibility depends on 
the veracity of that claim (Uhr, 2000). However, their corporate sponsorship, 
dedication to free market economics, and support of the principles of mutual 
obligation (Hyde, 2002) make them highly partisan. The rules of sustainability of dry 
liberal think tanks require that they influence political policy trajectory by strength of 
argument alone and this requires extensive publication of ideas. Their publications are 
as widely circulated as the generous funding permits and are written in layman’s 
language so that all may understand. There is nothing novel. It is a matter of 
frequency and no media format is ignored. The mantra is broadcast through books, 
magazines, newspapers, radio and television (Hyde, 2002; Warby, 2000).  
In opposition to the dry liberal think tanks, Warby (2000) of IPA nominates only The 
Evatt Foundation, while Uhr (2000) opposes BCA with the Australia Institute on 
environmental policy alone. ACOSS (Australian Council of Social Services) would 
seem to most citizens to stand in opposition to the ideology espoused by the dry 
liberal think tanks.  It has become the political representative of the welfare sector 
comprising myriad community welfare organisations that include every interest level 
from religious charity groups, to professional care groups and up to the state and 
territory councils of Social Services formed in the 1940’s and 1950’s (Mendes., 
2003). Its collective aims, in contrast with those of the dry think tanks, are equity, the 
elimination of poverty, and to improve the access of the poor to government services 
and facilities. Its final aim is where it seemingly attracts the most ire from the think 
tanks. It seeks a recognised role for the non-government welfare sector in policy 
making. Its influence with governments is not comparable to the likes of BCA or the 
ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions) because it has no economic bargaining 
power, but its various member bodies retain a collective influence through their 
memberships by way of educational publications to the extent of their limited budgets 
(ibid., 2003). This and the continual lobbying have prompted the American think 
tanks to initiate a program known as NGO Watch (American Enterprise Institute), 
whose rationale is detailed by Gary Johns of IPA (2003). He argues for limited 
democracy, contingent upon utility and opposed to the morality of the more liberal 
social democracy favoured by welfare organisations and mainstream non-government 
organisations (NGO’s). His attack on the credibility of what he calls trade-name 
NGO’s is based mainly on questioning the motivation of their professional staff in 
relation to funding. When the Howard Government commissions IPA to research 
reform of funding arrangements for organisations under the ACOSS umbrella, it 
would seem to confirm their role as protectors of welfare. A search of the ACOSS 
website, however, reveals that some of these organisations are the same ones who 
administer the mutual obligation policy prescriptions through the Job Network, 
organisations such as Mission Australia mentioned above. 
Entrenching the regime 
What if we lived in a society in which the system of justice rested on the postulate 
that only two-thirds, or nine-tenths of its members were fully human; the 
 7
remaining third or tenth not deserving of the same rights, except when arbitrarily 
granted?    (George, 1997, para.50) 
Susan George (1997) provided an account of the war of ideas that has been waged 
since the 1940’s around the issue of welfare. Her analysis, based on Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony, outlines the program of ideological domination pursued by the dry 
liberal think tanks in America. In using the term neo-liberal, she begs forgiveness 
from such great liberal thinkers as Adam Smith because, while the propaganda may 
pretend to be following liberal principles, the doctrine of the neo-liberals denies the 
spirit and ignores the moral and social teachings. George (1997) expands on the 
notion of unequal funding in this war of ideas by itemising sources in big business 
whose interests are served by the broadly circulating doctrine. In Australia, Lowy was 
keen to point out that the magnitude of his entry ($30M) had tipped the scale. McKew 
(2003) suggested that, while the focus of Lowy’s new think tank will be on foreign 
policy, with presence on the board of the Reserve Bank Governor, Ian McFarlane, and 
economist Ross Garnaut, economics are unlikely to be ignored. The Prime Minister 
congratulated Mr. Lowy on his venture to improve access for Australians to “the 
international marketplace of ideas” (Howard, 2003, para.3), an interesting association 
of the market and the way people think that tends to support George’s argument. 
George lamented the Left’s lack of representation in this arena. Without an effective 
opposition, there is no debate – just a one-sided barrage. 
The apparent bipartisan support for deregulation denies a role for ideology according 
to Brennan and Pincus (2002). Furthermore, since similar changes were occurring 
throughout the West, such institutional change was an optimal response to common 
external factors: increased competition, declining commodity prices, reduced 
transportation costs and increased mobility in labour markets. Their argument is a 
rejection of Michael Pusey’s views that economists are responsible for the changes 
and it explicitly ignores judgements about the quality of outcome of the policy 
changes. They define policy regime as the economic institutional settings in place and 
claim that this will reflect an imperative to serve the interest of the dominant political 
group. They then shift the focus of influence from Pusey’s ‘private interest’ to the 
‘special interest’ more familiar in the arguments espoused by George’s neo-liberals. 
This argument comprises a comparison of the electoral systems for the lower and 
upper houses of parliament. Because of the spread of geographically centred single-
member electorates in the lower house, capture by special interest groups is unlikely. 
This, of course, presumes that politicians represent the consensus of their electorate, a 
presumption covered, one supposes, by the economic term ceteris paribus, but hardly 
the norm in representative democracy. The upper house, however, with its 
proportional voting system allows for more extensive representation of special interest 
and so is susceptible to capture. This implies the more likely case that Senators, as 
distinct from MHR’s, must represent the views of their supporting vote. Within the 
single member electorate system, special interests need the right kind of geographic 
concentration to be politically potent (ibid., 2002). Under this account, Melbourne, 
with its manufacturing base and tradition of protection would be expected to be pro-
welfare policy. Perhaps, given Hyde’s (op.cit., 2002) rule of not wasting energy and 
resources on the converted, this explains the concentration of think tanks in that major 
city. 
This discursive account of the operation of Australia’s political institution and who it 
serves is serious in the context of the current 2003 debate on constitutional change. In 
1975, Constitutional crisis resulting from the Senate’s blocking of supply earned it the 
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ire of the Labor Party. In 2003, the Senate has blocked a raft of legislation on major 
structural reform for which the Howard Government claims a mandate. In a move to 
avoid the double dissolution election, two models of reform are being negotiated by 
the major parties (Coonan, 2003); the first, proposed by the Prime Minister is for a 
joint sitting once the Senate has twice rejected legislation; the second suggests that 
after a general election, if the Government is returned, such bills twice rejected in the 
previous Parliament would be put to a joint sitting. Minor parties object to both on the 
grounds that there would be no incentive for the Government to negotiate contested 
legislation and the Senate would become, in effect, a rubber stamp (Bartlett, 2003).  
According to Kingston (2003), the Senate provides a system for balance in the last 
major democracy that does not protect its citizens with a bill of rights. Removal of the 
power to reject legislation would disincentivate the media to cover Senate debates, 
thereby removing the trigger for detailed public debate on potentially contentious 
issues. It provides a way for government to limit democracy and citizens’ rights 
without their permission (Kingston, 2003). Her warnings resonate with the above 
words of Gary Johns’ on limited democracy. 
In Bernholz’ (1995) analysis of the causes of change in political-economic regimes, 
the tendencies of unlimited democracy pose a threat for the free market in the erosion 
of individual rights and limitation of freedom. The voting power of the shifting 
majority is in tension with the influence of minorities. Since the majority are rarely 
affected by single issues, they have little incentive to be well informed and 
theoretically, as in Brennan and Pincus (op.cit.2002), this benefits minorities in their 
influence of political parties. However, it is the education of the majority, their 
conversion to a state of well-informed, which provides stability over time. Limited 
democracy, adherence to the rule of law, and creation of a well-educated but biased 
majority are the keys to success for the free market economy. Bernholz’ analysis 
highlights the importance of ideology in the process of stabilising the majority, which 
seems to support the contention of George (op.cit., 1997), and dovetails with the rules 
and objectives of the think tanks as provided by Hyde (2002). In this fashion, the 
minority, with government support, can influence and hold the majority.  
Conclusion 
Uhr’s deliberative democracy, with a majority of citizens who contribute more than 
just a casually informed vote, who contribute a spread of explicit preferences for a 
government seeking to make policy for the good of the people, and with a civil 
society that does more than just stay out of the way of politics, stands in sharp 
contrast to the limited democracy espoused by Johns on behalf of the dry liberal think 
tanks, that required for market dominance in Bernholz’ analysis.  Leaving aside 
university-based research centres – themselves under threat of institutional change - 
where is the forum for such a debate? Both the history of deregulation provided by 
Briggs and Buchanan, and the analysis of institutional change provided by Brennan 
and Pincus show convergence of partisanship on the part of the major political parties. 
Deregulation has simultaneously eroded the power of collective bargaining for 
workers and their unions, and boosted corporate power. Full employment is redefined 
to contain high levels of unemployment. Despite this, the unemployed are set the 
quixotic task of endlessly looking for jobs that don’t exist; kept at it by the fear of 
being punished by members of the umbrella organisation that is supposed to 
champion their cause. For the unemployed, there is little more than negative 
incentive, the idea that a job would at least get the Job Network off one’s back. 
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For those who espouse the cause of limited democracy, the world is a rosier place.  
Governments invest in public deliberation – in think tank research that purports to 
provide specialised input to the decision-making process; and corporations contribute 
to partisan research that will support mutually beneficial policy. The importance, for 
credibility’s sake, of determinable separation between policy-maker and adviser, 
noted by Uhr, pales when there is little effective opposition to question that 
credibility; and the dry liberal think tanks credit only the Evatt Foundation and the 
Australia Institute as a concern here. There seems little separation between the dry 
liberal think tanks and some policy makers in the 2003 cabinet of the Coalition 
Government. Contrary to Uhr’s optimistic analysis, NGO Watch would ensure that 
civil society and its institutions are forced to stay out of the way of politics. 
Curtailment of the Senate’s power of veto would almost certainly bring about a 
reduction in the potential of citizens to contribute more than their vote.  
The funding inequality and the same dearth of Left think tanks, observed by George 
in America, occurs in Australia, and the question remains of a source of competitive 
levels of funding. The tax carrots for corporate donations to research do not stack up 
against the sticks that are expected to incentivate the unemployed. Brennan and 
Pincus deny a role for ideology, arguing bipartisanship. Warby calls them values. 
Abbott calls them conservative values. Howard refers to stable values and obligation 
to the community. Entsch would instil in the nation’s children a sense of mutual 
obligation. Abbott likens the Job Network to a system of carrots and sticks to ensure 
the unemployed get the message. Aside from children and the unemployed, there is no 
program of instilling equally in all a concept of mutual obligation. Entrenchment of 
this regime that domineers the powerless removes the obligation “to condescend to 
persuade…inferiors” (op.cit.).   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10
References 
 
Abbot, Tony. Speeches.  (1999-04-04). Bridging the incentive gap. Address to Australia 
Unlimited Conference.  Retrieved September 13, 2003, from 
http://www.tonyabbott.com.au/speech/Incentive%20Gap.htm  
 
Abbott, Tony. Speeches. (2003-07-16) Employee share ownership launch. Retrieved 
September 13, 2003, from http://www.tonyabbott.com.au/speech/share.htm  
 
Abbott, Tony. Speeches. (2003-08-08). The west and its challenges.Address to CIS 
consilium. Retrieved September 13, 2003, from 
http://www.tonyabbott.com.au/speech/west.html    
 
Abbott, Tony. Speeches. (2003-09-25). Taking obligation seriously. Address to the Mission 
Employment Launch. Retrieved September 29, 2003, from 
http://www.tonyabbott.com.au/speech/obligation.html  
 
Abbott, Tony (2002). Losing the legislation fixation. Address to the H. R. Nicholls Society. 
Retrieved September 28, 2003, from 
http://www.hrnicholls.com.au/nicholls/nichvo23/abbott2002.html  
 
American Enterprise Institute (2003) NGO Watch. Retrieved September, 23, 2003, from 
http://www.ngowatch.org/ngo.htm 
 
Barns, G. (2003-04-24). Is this the end of the liberal party? The Age newspaper . Retrieved 
September 15, 2003, from 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/04/23/1050777301768.html  
 
Bartlett, A. (2003-06-10). PM’s plans to neuter the senate show he’s lost touch. The Age 
newspaper. Retrieved September 16, 2003, from 
http://www.democrats.org.au/articles/?article_id=8  
 
Bernholz, P. (1995). Causes of change in economic-political regimes. In. L. Gerken (Ed.) 
Competition among institutions. London: MacMillan Press. Retrieved February 17, 
2003, from http://rrojasdatabank.net/borner/borner4.pdf  
 
Brennan, G. & Castles, F. G. (Eds.) (2002). Australia reshaped: 200 years of institutional 
transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Brennan, G. & Pincus, J. (2002). Australia’s economic institutions. In. G. Brennan & F. G. 
Castles (Eds.) Australia reshaped: 200 years of institutional transformation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Briggs, C. & Buchanan, J. (2000). Australian labour market deregulation: A critical 
assessment. Parliamentary research paper 21 1999-2000. Retrieved April 4, 2002, 
from  http://www.aph.gov.au/library.pubs/rp/1999-2000/2000rp21.htm    
 
Campbell, R. H., Skinner, A. S. & Todd, W. B. (Eds.) (1981) An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Indianapolis, Liberty Press. 
 
Cockett, R. (1995). Thinking the unthinkable: think tanks and the economic counter-
revolution, 1931-1983. London: Fontana Press. 
 11
 Coonan, H. (2003-08-23). The Australian senate-from gatekeeper to gridlock. Address to the 
Australian Davos Connection Leadership Conference. Retrieved October 1, 2003, 
from http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/speeches/2003/010b.asp?pf=1  
 
Crombie, R. (2002). Unemployment policy in Australia: the pertinence of French style 
reductions to work time. Conference paper for the Centre for Social Change Research 
2002. Retrieved  June 10, 2003, from 
http://www.socialchange.qut.edu.au/conference/docs/Conf%20Papers/CrombieBob.pdf  
 
Entsch, W. (1997-11-20). Social security legislation amendment (youth allowance) bill 1997: 
second reading. Australian House Hansard p.10993. Retrieved September 23, 2003, 
from 
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=541770&table=HANSARDR  
 
Finn, D. (1997). Working nation: welfare reform and the Australian job compact for the long 
term unemployed. Darlinghurst: ACOSS. 
 
George, S. (1997). Winning the war of ideas. Dissent. Summer edition. Retrieved August 19, 
2003, from http://tni.org/george/articles/dissent.htm  
 
Hall, J. (2000-08-16). Vocational education and training funding amendment bill 2000: 
second reading. Australian House Hansard  p.19100. Retrieved September 22, 2003, 
from 
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=417833&table=HANSARDR  
 
Howard, J. PM Speeches (1999-05-04). Building a stronger and fairer Australia: 
Liberalisation in economic policy and modern conservatism in social policy. Address 
to the Australia Unlimited Roundtable. Retrieved September 23, 2003, from 
http://www..pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1999/AustraliaUnlimitedRoundtable.htm   
 
Howard, J. PM Speeches. (2003-05-27). Congratulations to Frank Lowy. Retrieved 
September 28, 2003, from  
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/media_Release153.html  
 
Hyde, J. (2002).  Dry: in defence of dry liberal think tanks. Melbourne: Institute of Public 
Affairs. 
 
Johns, G. (2003). The NGO Challenge: Whose democracy is it anyway? Retrieved October 2, 
2003, from http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030630_johns.pdf  
 
Kemp, D. (1997-03-19). Social security legislation amendment (work for the dole) bill 1997: 
second reading. Australian House Hansard , p.2459. Retrieved September 22, 2003, 
from http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/dailys/dr190397.pdf  
 
Kingston, M. (2003-06-09). Howard’s senate strip: all power to him. Sydney Morning 
Herald. Retrieved September 28, 2003, from 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/06/09/1055010916913.html  
 12
 13
 
 
McKew, M. (2003). International Rescue. The Bulletin Vol. 121 No. 22 Retrieved October 1, 
2003, from 
http://bulletin.ninemsn.com.au/bulletin/EdDesk.nsf/0/69b2d49d462a1a2eca256d3100
77df28?OpenDocument  
 
Marsh, I. (1995). Beyond the two party system : political representation, economic 
competitiveness and Australian politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
McMahon, M. (1996). I cry for my people. Brisbane: McMahon Publishing. 
 
Mendes, P. (2003). Australia’s welfare wars: the players, the politics and the ideologies. 
Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. 
 
Mitchell, W. (2003-06-14). There are simply not enough jobs. The Age newspaper . 
Retrieved September 30, 2003, from 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/06/13/1055220770874.html  
 
Mont Pelerin (Citizens Electoral Council). Retrieved July, 15, 2003, from 
(http://www.nex.net.au/users/reidgck/MONT-PEL.HTM) 
 
 
O’Chee, W. G. (1992-12-08). Matter of public importance: Keating government. Australian 
Senate Hansard . p.4408. Retrieved September 22, 2003, from 
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=541770&table=HANSARDR  
 
Parkinson, T. (2000). Jeff: the rise and fall of a political phenomenon. Ringwood: Penguin 
Australia. 
 
Vanstone, A. (2003-07-21). Passive welfare-killing them softly? Centre for Full Employment 
and Equity, CofFEE Public Policy Lecture Series. Retrieved August 29, 2003, from 
http://e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee/docs/public_policy/vanstone_21_07_2003.cfm   
 
Saunders, P. & Tsumori, K. (2003). How to reduce long term unemployment. The Centre for 
Independent Studies. Retrieved September 11, 2003, from 
http://www.cis.org.au/IssueAnalysis/ia40/ia%2040.pdf   
 
Sydney Morning Herald (2002-12-11). Not just small change. Retrieved September 13, 2003, 
from http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/12/10/1039379834828.html   
 
The Peel Web (2003). The old poor law 1795-1834. Retrieved September 15, 2003, 
from http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/terrace/adw03/peel/poorlaw/plaa.htm  
 
Uhr, J. (2000). Think tanks and the policy-making community in Australia. NIRA 
Review, 7 (2), 35-40. 
 
Warby, M. (2000). Role of the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) in public debate. Talk 
to RMIT communications students, April 6, 2000. Retrieved August 5, 2003, 
from http://www.ipa.org.au/Speechesandsubmssns/mwRMITipa.html  
